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‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, 
subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is 
false.  In this paper, I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a 
series of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I show that these para-
doxes can nevertheless be overcome if we accept the hypothesis that self-
deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the inﬂ uence of 
emotions on judgment. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpre-
tation of the phenomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting bias’, highlighting 
the role of emotional biases in akratic behavior. Finally, I argue that 
we are not the helpless victims of our irrational attitudes, insofar as we 
have the ability—and arguably the epistemic obligation—to counteract 
motivational biases.
Keywords: Akrasia, emotions, epistemic responsibility, hyperbolic 
discounting, irrationality, motivational biases, precommitment, 
self-deception, self-control.
1. Introduction
Audi suggests that “a philosophy of mind that cannot account for [self-
deception] is seriously deﬁ cient, and a psychology that says nothing 
about it is unwarrantedly narrow” (1988: 92). Yet, self-deception poses 
both a descriptive and a normative challenge. From a descriptive point 
of view, the difﬁ culty concerns the very possibility of self-deception, 
particularly if we accept the inﬂ uential ‘intentionalist’ model (David-
son 1985a, Pears 1984, Sartre 1969, Scott-Kakures 1996, Gardner 
1993, Bermudez 1997), which maintains that self-deceivers typically 
get themselves to believe that p is true, knowing all the while that p is 
310 V. Correia, From Self-Deception to Self-Control
false. From a normative point of view, on the other hand, there is con-
siderable controversy over two independent questions: First, whether 
self-deception may or may not contribute to people’s overall happiness 
(for a review, see McKay & Dennett 2009); and second, whether it is 
morally acceptable to deceive oneself (Barnes 1997, Clifford 1994, Mar-
tin 2009).
In this paper, I initially address the descriptive question. I critically 
examine the postulates of the intentionalist model, and argue that it is 
inextricably paradoxical, leading inevitably to at least one of four para-
doxes (sections 2 and 3). In section 4, I argue that the rival ‘motiva-
tional’ account proposed by Mele (1987, 2001a) succeeds in overcoming 
each of these paradoxes, Further, I show that this view is consistent 
with the empirical studies carried out by social psychologists upon the 
topic of judgment biases. According to it, self-deception and other phe-
nomena of motivated irrationality (wishful thinking, rationalization, 
motivational biases, etc.) stem from the inﬂ uence that strong emotions 
exert over the process of belief formation. But emotional inﬂ uences 
are also liable to affect practical judgments and the process of decision 
making. In section 5, I bring forward a motivational version of the phe-
nomenon of ‘hyperbolic discounting’ that seems to account for ordinary 
cases of akrasia (Ainslie 2001, Elster 2007, Loewenstein et al. 2003). In 
light of this hypothesis, it is the inﬂ uence of an affective state (emotion, 
desire) that triggers the temporary preference reversal thought to be 
the root of akratic action. Finally, I argue that we have the ability—and 
perhaps the moral obligation—to counteract the effects of motivational 
biases upon our judgments (epistemic self-control), either by control-
ling the process of belief formation or by resorting to indirect strategies 
of precommitment.
2. Deciding to believe
According to the intentionalist account (Davidson 1985a, Pears 1984, 
Sartre 1969, Scott-Kakures 1996, Gardner 1993, Bermudez 1997) 
self-deception is not an accidental phenomenon that happens to the 
agent in spite of him, but rather an intentional process whereby the 
self-deceiver adopts a false belief that seems to enhance psychological 
comfort. This is allegedly what happens, for example, when a termi-
nally ill patient persists in believing that she will survive despite the 
unanimous prognosis of several doctors. Davidson evokes the similar 
example of Carlos, an individual who knows he will probably fail the 
test for a driving license, given his lack of preparedness, but manages 
to convince himself that he will succeed, despite being “aware that the 
totality of the evidence points to failure” (Davidson 1985a: 207).
To be sure, this kind of attitude is clearly irrational from an epistem-
ic point of view, given that the desire to believe that p is surely not a 
good reason to believe that p. However, from a practical (or utilitar-
ian) point of view, it is arguably rational to prefer a sweet illusion to 
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the bitter truth. In fact, the criterion of practical rationality generally 
adopted by decision theorists is a purely formal one which is indiffer-
ent to the question of truth: The main requirement for an action to 
be rational is that it remains consistent with the agent’s preferences; 
in other words, that it seeks to maximize the agent’s well-being. And 
from that perspective, both Carlos and the terminally ill patient seem 
to have legitimate reasons to believe (what they suspect to be) a false-
hood. Carlos’s unrealistic optimism is justiﬁ ed by the fact that he can-
not bear the thought of failing the test again, let alone the possibility 
that his optimism might bring him some extra conﬁ dence and actually 
increase his chances of passing the test successfully. As to the termi-
nally ill patient, similarly, there seem to be valid practical reasons to 
adopt a positive illusion: First, it will spare her the anxiety of thinking 
that death is very near; second, it will bolster her motivation to ﬁ ght 
the disease (which might contribute to prolong her survival); and third, 
it will make her happier during the little time she has left to live.
To this extent, the decision to deceive one-self is very similar to 
whatever practical decision, although its outcome is a belief rather 
than an action. As Davidson (1985a: 207) suggests, the self-deceiver’s 
“practical reasoning is straightforward”: He begins by deliberating 
that it is preferable, all things considered, to adopt the false belief that 
p; then forms the intention to deceive herself; and ﬁ nally, he acts ac-
cordingly, for the process “requires the agent to do something with the 
aim of changing his own views” (ibid.). Hence, self-deception can be 
described as an action in its own right, much like other-deception, and 
some philosophers even suggest that self-deception is a sort of akratic 
behavior in the cognitive sphere (Heil 1984, Rorty 1983), while others 
go as far as to call it an act of “epistemic cowardice” in the face of anxi-
ety (Johnston 1988: 85, Barnes 1997: 172).
But if self-deception is an action, what sort of action is it? Most in-
tentionalists acknowledge that people are not at liberty to believe that 
p merely because they wish to believe that p1. On the other hand, it 
seems possible to cause oneself to believe something via some indirect 
strategy. Intentionalists mention several strategies of self-induced de-
ception, some more plausible than others. First, the self-deceiver may 
try to simulate a belief, acting as if it were true, with the hope that it 
might eventually become a sincere conviction. This is the method Pas-
cal (1958: 233) famously recommended to those who wished to persuade 
themselves of God’s existence: “Follow the way by which they began: 
that is by doing everything as if they believed, by taking holy water, by 
having Masses said, etc. Naturally, even this will make you believe and 
will dull you”. Second, one may resort to suggestion techniques, such as 
hypnosis (Williams 1973) or even self-hypnosis (Naylor 1985). Third, it 
is sometimes possible to manipulate the available information in such 
1 For a fuller analysis of the paradoxes of direct doxastic voluntarism, see for 
example Bennett (1990) and Williams (1973).
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a way that the desired belief will appear more plausible in the future. 
McLaughlin evokes a stratagem of this kind:
In order to miss an unpleasant meeting three month ahead, Mary deliber-
ately writes the wrong date for the meeting in her appointment book, a date 
later than the actual date of the meeting. She does this so that three months 
later when she consults the book, she will come mistakenly to believe the 
meeting is on that date and, as a result, miss the meeting”. (McLaughlin 
1988: 31)2
And ﬁ nally, the self-deceiver may also try to control the direction of 
his attention, focusing on the evidence that seems to support the belief 
she wishes to adopt or diverting it from the evidence that seems to 
disconﬁ rm it. According to Davidson (1985a: 208) this is typically what 
the action of deceiving oneself is about: “The action involved may be no 
more than an intentional directing of attention away from the evidence 
in favor of p; or it may involve the active search for evidence against 
p”. To conclude, we may say that even though it seems impossible to 
believe something at will, hic et nunc, it seems nevertheless possible to 
induce the adhesion to certain beliefs indirectly, via the manipulation 
of the process of evidence gathering.
One appealing aspect of the intentionalist account is that it ren-
ders the agent responsible for his epistemic behavior. Insofar as self-
deception stems from the agent’s deliberate intention, just like oth-
er-deception, it makes sense to impute to him the responsibility for 
adopting an illusional belief. Rather than a mere victim of his illusions, 
the agent appears to be the author of an irrational act, someone who 
chooses to “bury his head in the sand” or “refuses to face reality”, to 
use some common expressions. Further, the self-deceiver may also be 
held accountable for the potential implications of his act, given that il-
lusional beliefs may have negative consequences not only for the agent 
but also for others. With regard to the agent himself, some studies indi-
cate that positive illusions are often maladaptive. For example, cancer 
patients who are overly optimistic about their medical condition may 
fail to seek treatment when faced with alarming symptoms of cancer 
recurrence (Dunning et al. 2004). And more generally, as Taylor (1989: 
237) points out, “Unrealistic optimism might lead people to ignore le-
gitimate risks in their environment and to fail to take measures to 
offset those risks”. With regard to the implications of self-deception for 
others, Clifford’s famous example of the shipowner provides a very sug-
gestive illustration. Despite suspecting that his ship was no longer safe 
and seaworthy, and that letting it sail would put at risk many people’s 
lives, the shipowner persuades himself that nothing could go wrong, 
“put[ting] his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all 
these unhappy families” and “dismissing from his mind all ungenerous 
suspicions” (Clifford 1877: 177). The interest of this example is that it 
2 See also Davidson (1985: 208, note 5) and Mele (2001: 16) for similar 
examples.
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emphasizes the extent to which someone’s illusions may be harmful to 
others. And assuming that such illusions are self-induced, as intention-
alists claim, we are just as responsible for irrational beliefs as we are 
responsible for irrational actions.
3. The paradoxes of intentionalism
The intentionalist hypothesis raises nonetheless several paradoxes 
which cast doubt on its validity. The ﬁ rst was brought to light by Sartre 
in his famous analysis of mauvaise foi. To be able to persuade myself 
that p is true I must initially recognize that p is false, otherwise I would 
not deceive myself strictly speaking, but simply commit an involuntary 
mistake. Sartre (1969: 49) writes: “The one to whom the lie is told and 
the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must 
know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in 
my capacity as the one deceived”. But if the process of deceiving myself 
into believing that p requires me to acknowledge initially that not-p, it 
must be that I hold two contradictory beliefs simultaneously at a given 
point in time. But is that mentally possible? Is it possible, for example, 
to believe that I am losing my hair and, at the same time, believe that 
I am not losing my hair?
Mele (1998) points out a second difﬁ culty, which concerns the very 
possibility of executing a strategy to fool oneself. He terms it the strate-
gy paradox: “In general, A cannot successfully employ a deceptive strat-
egy against B if B knows A’s intention and plan. This seems plausible 
as well when A and B are the same person. A potential self-deceiver’s 
knowledge of his intention and strategy would seem typically to render 
them ineffective” (Mele 1998: 38). Even if the agent’s strategy consists 
simply in disregarding evidence for the dreaded belief, the paradox 
remains, insofar as the effort to neglect a particular information pre-
supposes an awareness of that very information. As Baumeister (1993: 
168) observes, “one must ﬁ rst notice something in order to be careful 
not to notice it—but if one has already noticed it, then it is too late”.
Furthermore, the assumption that self-deception is an intentional 
and deliberate process relies on the assumption that it is beneﬁ cial 
to adopt an illusional belief. Yet, in most cases it seems counter-pro-
ductive to embrace a falsehood, insofar as it undermines the ability 
to intervene in the world efﬁ ciently in order to promote our goals and 
interests. This problem could be termed the economic paradox of posi-
tive illusions: on the one hand, the purpose of self-deception would be to 
acquire a pleasant or rewarding belief, but on the other hand the very 
adoption of a false belief seems to compromise the capacity to maximize 
well-being in the long-term. Elster (1999: 438) insists on this aspect: 
“To navigate the world successfully, one needs beliefs that are as good 
as they can be, given the available evidence. Someone who believes 
that p merely because he wants p to be the case is more likely to see 
some of his long-term goals frustrated”. After all, the maximization of 
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our preferences depends to a great extent on an accurate assessment 
of (a) the foreseeable costs and beneﬁ ts of each feasible option, and of 
(b) the probability associated to each option. If an agent is self-deceived 
about any of these aspects, she runs the risk of choosing an option that 
eventually minimizes her well-being. Thus, to come back to Carlos’ ex-
ample, we may observe that by getting himself to believe that he will 
probably succeed in the test Carlos only obtains a small beneﬁ t (reduc-
tion of anxiety, boost of self-conﬁ dence), while he risks undermining 
the greater beneﬁ t of passing the test, to the extent that his false sense 
of preparedness is likely to discourage any further efforts of prepara-
tion. A more realistic assessment, on the other hand, would allow him 
to acknowledge his limitations and to overcome them through his ac-
tions, thereby increasing his chances to succeed in the exam.3
And ﬁ nally, assuming that self-deception requires the subject’s in-
tention, how can we make sense of negative cases of self-deception—
what Mele (1999) proposes to call ‘twisted self-deception’—that is, 
cases in which the subject persuades herself of something painful and 
undesirable. How are we to explain, for example, the jealous person’s 
delusional belief that her partner is being unfaithful, or the paranoid’s 
unjustiﬁ ed belief that she is constantly being persecuted, or the pes-
simist’s unrealistically negative predictions of the future? Why would 
someone intentionally decide to adopt beliefs that have undesirable 
effects both in the short-term (they make us “feel bad”) and in the 
long-term (they propel irrational actions)? This phenomenon could be 
termed the economic paradox of negative illusions.
Most proponents of intentionalism try to bypass these paradoxes by 
postulating the hypothesis that the mind is divided (Audi 1982, David-
son 1985b, Fingarette 1982, Gardner 1993, Pears 1984). In light of this 
assumption, to say that a given person deceives herself into believing 
that p actually means that a part of her mind, who knows (or sus-
pects) that p is false, deceives another part of her mind into believeing 
that p is true. To that extent, it seems no longer paradoxical to suggest 
that the self-deceiver holds two contradictory beliefs, given that those 
beliefs pertain to different sub-systems of the mind. However, the di-
visionist hypothesis is an ad hoc postulate that arguably raises more 
problems than it solves4. Although it is widely acknowledged that there 
are pathological cases of ‘mental dissociation’ (or ‘multiple personality 
disorders’) that involve a differentiation of the subject’s personality, it 
has never been conﬁ rmed empirically that people’s minds are essen-
3 The exception to this principle would perhaps be the terminally ill patient who 
deceives himself into believing that he will survive. But that is due precisely to the 
fact that the notion of ‘long-term’ ceases to make sense in such a context.
4 Davidson (1985b: 353) explicitly acknowledges that the only reason he resorts 
to the divisionist hypothesis is that there is no other way, in his view, to account for 
irrational phenomena such as self-deception and akrasia: “I have urged in several 
papers that it is only by postulating a kind of compartmentalization of the mind that 
we can understand, and begin to explain, irrationality”.
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tially composed of different sub-systems, as Freudian accounts claim, 
nor that they experience temporary divisions whenever they act, think 
or feel irrationally. Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out, the division-
ist model implies the ascription of attitudes such as desires, beliefs, 
representations, memories and sensations to different sub-systems of 
the mind when it only makes sense to ascribe these attitudes to the 
person as a whole (the in-dividual). Wittgenstein (1958: § 281) writes: 
“Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a liv-
ing human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; 
is deaf; is conscious or unconscious”. The problem with the ascription of 
anthropomorphic attributes to alleged parts of the mind—which Kenny 
(1971: 65) calls the ‘homunculus fallacy’—is that it portrays the dif-
ferent homunculi as if they were different persons within the person 
without being able to account for the unity of the whole.5
4. The motivational account
Davidson (1985b: 184) claims that “the underlying paradox of irratio-
nality, from which no theory can entirely escape, is this: if we explain 
it too well, we turn it into a concealed form of rationality”. Yet, it seems 
possible to overcome each of the above-mentioned paradoxes without 
denying the irrational nature of the phenomenon, provided that we ac-
cept the idea that self-deception is due to a particular motive, rather 
than to an intention, and more exactly to the inﬂ uence of that motive 
upon the subject’s cognitive faculties (Barnes 1997, Lazar 1999, Mele 
1987, 2001a). According to the ‘motivational’ account, self-deception is 
typically an involuntary process that occurs without the subject’s aware-
ness, via the cognitive distortions (or biases) that emotional states are 
liable to exert on people’s judgment. The motive in question could be 
the desire to believe that p (Mele 1987), the anxiety that not-p (Barnes 
1997) or any other emotion related to p (Lazar 1999, Mele 2001a).
This hypothesis is consistent with the profusion of empirical studies 
carried out by cognitive and social psychologists from the 1960s on-
wards, which indicate that emotions may affect the way we process and 
interpret the available evidence in a variety of ways (for a review, see 
Kunda 1999; Gilovitch et al. 2002). More speciﬁ cally, emotions seem 
to induce motivationally biased beliefs at three different levels (Mele 
2001a: 26–27).  Firstly, emotions affect the subject’s memory and at-
tention to evidence. An excessively jealous person, for instance, tends 
to focus too much on her partner’s behavior and to see every unac-
countable attitude as a sign of inﬁ delity. This is why Iago ﬁ nds it so 
easy to manipulate Othello, for he knows that “Triﬂ es light as air are 
to the jealous conﬁ rmations strong as proofs of holy writ” (Othello, III, 
3). Secondly, partly because of this, emotions also affect the process of 
5 This objection was initially raised by Sartre (1969: 53) in his critique of Freud’s 
theory.
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evidence gathering. In motivated cases of ‘conﬁ rmation bias’, in par-
ticular, people tend to favor the information that conﬁ rms what they 
desire to believe. According to Oswald and Grosjean (2004: 81), “this 
tendency exists … because the possibility of rejecting the [desired be-
lief] is linked to anxiety or other negative emotions”. And thirdly, emo-
tions may also bias the very interpretation of the available information. 
A typical example of this is the person ‘in love’ who mistakes a sign of 
friendship for the expression of a mutual feeling.
The motivational approach presents three main advantages in com-
parison to the intentionalist approach. In the ﬁ rst place, as we have 
seen, it ﬁ ts well with the empirical studies conducted by psychologists 
in the past decades. Although these studies do not falsify the inten-
tionalist hypothesis strictly speaking, they conﬁ rm that the motiva-
tional hypothesis is valid for a vast number of cases. In the second 
place, it provides a generalized theory of cognitive irrationality, insofar 
as it refers to one and the same psychological phenomenon—motivated 
judgment—to account not only for self-deception, but also for wishful 
thinking, rationalization and a host of other motivated biases (conﬁ r-
mation bias, egocentric bias, optimism bias, overconﬁ dence effect, self-
serving bias, etc).
And in the third place, perhaps more importantly, the motivational 
model seems to overcome each of the above-mentioned paradoxes—
which no longer appear to be the so-called “paradoxes of self-decep-
tion”, but more exactly the paradoxes of the intentionalist account of 
self-deception. In fact, once we assume that self-deception is an invol-
untary and unconscious process, the two ﬁ rst paradoxes cease to pose 
a threat: On the one hand, the assumption that two contradictory be-
liefs must coexist in the subject’s mind is no longer required (doxastic 
paradox), given that the discrepancy lies solely between the subject’s 
belief and what the evidence clearly suggests; and, on the other hand, 
the conundrum of a subject who intentionally deceives himself without 
being aware of his own intention and plan of deception (strategy para-
dox) also seems to dissipate, given that the subject is now seen as the 
victim and not the author of the illusion. Similarly, the two econom-
ic paradoxes also disappear if we accept the idea that self-deception 
stems from the inﬂ uence of emotions on cognitive processes. Unlike 
practical reasoning and intentional decisions, motivational biases are 
not supposed to ensure the maximization of people’s well-being, nei-
ther in the long-term (paradox of positive cases) nor in the short-term 
(paradox of negative cases). And ﬁ nally, the motivational hypothesis 
does not require the postulate that the mind is divided, thus avoid-
ing the homunculus fallacy, given that the conﬂ ict within the subject’s 
mind is polarized between an emotion (or a desire) and a belief, and not 
between two contradictory beliefs. This is not to deny that mental par-
titioning may occur in extreme cases of irrationality, but simply that 
the divisionist hypothesis is not required to account for ordinary cases 
of self-deception.
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If this analysis is correct, the subject who deceives herself (or per-
haps more accurately, the subject who is self-deceived) is simply the 
victim of a phenomenon of judgment distortion that is both involuntary 
and unconscious (Kunda 1990, Pohl 2004, Mercier & Sperber 2009). 
However, it is worth noting that the motivational account is not incom-
patible with the notion of epistemic responsibility, that is, the notion 
that people are responsible for the way they think, and not just for the 
way they act (Audi 2008, Clifford 1877, Engel 2001). Granted, beliefs 
are typically involuntary states (Bennett 1990, Montmarquet 2008, 
Williams 1973), and so is the phenomenon of motivated irrationality. 
However, we have the ability to exert a certain degree of control over 
the process of belief formation. As Audi (2008: 403) points out, we must 
distinguish between the question of the voluntariness of belief, on the 
one hand, and the question of the voluntariness of the grounding of be-
lief, on the other. Although one cannot avoid self-deception directly, by 
an act of will, given that the process occurs without people’s awareness, 
it seems possible nonetheless to make sure that our beliefs are formed 
in conformity with certain epistemic requirements (e.g., consistency, 
justiﬁ cation, consideration of all available evidence). The greater the 
epistemic control over the process of belief formation, the lesser the 
impact of emotions on the cognitive processes. In this sense, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that we are partly and indirectly responsible for 
our illusions.
5. Self-deception, akrasia and precommitment
The question of epistemic responsibility appears all the more impor-
tant if we take into account the impact that irrational beliefs seem 
to have on the practical sphere. More speciﬁ cally, the phenomenon of 
motivated irrationality is also susceptible to affect the evaluative judg-
ments through which we assess the value of feasible options, and sub-
sequently the optimality of the decisions that are based upon those 
judgments.
According to some decision theorists (Ainslie 2001, Elster 2007; see 
Loewenstein et al. 2003 for a review) this is precisely what happens 
when people act against their better judgment (akrasia). The weak-
willed agent is generally described as a person who judges that the 
option A (e.g. improve her health) is clearly preferable, all things con-
sidered, to the option B (e.g. smoke a cigarette); decides to do A rather 
than B after a pondered deliberation, and ends up doing B nevertheless. 
The most paradoxical aspect about this phenomenon is that the weak-
willed agent chooses the worst available option despite knowing that it 
minimizes her interest. One plausible explanation, however, is that the 
akratic agent falls prey to a cognitive bias—known as the “discounting 
bias” in the language of psychologists—which may be characterized as 
a sort of “myopia” regarding future preferences (Strotz 1956). Loosely 
speaking, the idea is simply that we tend to overrate the instrumental 
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value of immediate options and, conversely, to underrate the instru-
mental value of future options. As Ainslie (2001: 38) observes, “[people] 
tend to prefer smaller, earlier rewards to larger, later ones temporar-
ily, during the time that they’re imminent”. In addition, Ainslie’s re-
search shows that the curve describing the devaluation of future goods 
proportionally to their delay is hyperbolic, and not just exponential, 
which means that “the smaller reward is temporarily preferred for a 
period before it is available” (Ainslie 2001: 32). In consequence, when 
the motivation to defer gratiﬁ cation is insufﬁ cient, we may end up giv-
ing in to temptation and choosing a small immediate reward instead of 
a future greater reward.
To that extent, the problem is not that the agent acts against his 
own judgment (Davidson 1980, 1985b), but more exactly that he acts 
on the basis of a temporarily biased judgment, presumably due to the 
inﬂ uence of a strong emotion or desire. In this sense, as Elster (1999: 
429) points out, akrasia typically involves a diachronic inconsistency 
(rather than a synchronic inconsistency) between the agent’s attitudes. 
For instance, an agent who has decided to loose weight may enter a res-
taurant at time 1 with the certainty that it is preferable to sacriﬁ ce the 
small reward of having a dessert in order to ensure the greater reward 
of loosing weight with health beneﬁ ts. Yet, Elster explains, the immi-
nent availability of the reward may affect his judgment for a moment, 
and during that moment the reward of eating a dessert might appear 
superior to the remote reward of being healthier: “As the meal pro-
gresses, a preference reversal occurs at time t*, and when the waiter 
asks him, at time 2, whether he wants to order dessert he answers in 
the afﬁ rmative … He is not, however, acting against his better judg-
ment at the time of ordering dessert” (Elster 1999: 430). After leaving 
the restaurant—say, at time 3—it is likely that the agent returns to his 
initial preference, acknowledging with regret that he made a mistake. 
But that is presumably due to the fact that desires fade once they are 
satisﬁ ed, and so do their effects on people’s judgment. Once the craving 
for the dessert dissipates, the agent is able to see clearly that it was 
indeed in his best interest to abstain from the immediate pleasure.
At the same time, this understanding of the mechanisms underly-
ing akratic behaviour seems to have considerable implications on the 
normative level. In particular, the awareness that the propensity to 
succumb to temptation is often due to the inﬂ uence of desires on prac-
tical judgement—what one might call a “weakness of the judgment” 
rather than a “weakness of will”—facilitates the elaboration of indirect 
methods of self-control. For example, the person who wants to loose 
weight may adopt the strategy of buying groceries shortly after a meal, 
when cravings are weaker and therefore less likely to trigger a prefer-
ence reversal. Another efﬁ cient strategy consists in limiting future op-
tions deliberately in an attempt to eliminate the very possibility of suc-
cumbing to temptation (Elster 2007: 237). An obvious method to avoid 
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overeating sweets at home, for example, is to avoid having sweets at 
home. Likewise, the indebted consumer who systematically succumbs 
to the temptation of purchasing on credit might want to cut up his 
credit cards with a pair of scissors. A similar strategy is proposed in 
some countries to pathological gamblers who wish to overcome their 
addiction: by signing a voluntary self-exclusion declaration, the gam-
bler is irreversibly banned from casinos and can no longer succumb 
to the urge of playing again. This sort of device corresponds to what 
economists generically term precommitment strategy, which consists in 
eliminating or imposing restrictions on future options. The locus clas-
sicus of precommitment is the Homeric episode in which Ulysses in-
structs his crewmen to tie him to the mast to be able to hear the Sirens’ 
alluring songs without incurring the risk of running his ship onto the 
treacherous rocks. Precommitment thus involve the acknowledgement 
of one’s propensity to give in to temptation, along with the notion that 
the “present self” should constraint the choices of the “future self” in 
order to ensure the maximization of well-being in the long-term.
But self-control by precommitment does not always entail the elim-
ination of future options. In certain cases, it may be more useful to 
impose a sanction on the tempting option. Elster (2007: 238) evokes a 
convincing example: “If I begin saving for Christmas but ﬁ nd myself 
taking money out of my savings account instead of keeping it there … 
I may put my savings into a high-interest account that carries a pen-
alty for early withdrawal, thus combining premium and penalty”. In a 
study about the efﬁ ciency of precommitment against procrastination, 
Arieli and Wertenbroch (2002: 221) demonstrated that “people are will-
ing to self-impose deadlines to overcome procrastination, even when 
these deadlines are costly”. More signiﬁ cantly, their study showed that 
precommitment to deadlines is successful both in reducing procrastina-
tion and in helping students achieve better grades. For example, stu-
dents who chose to be penalized at the rate of one percent of the grade 
for each day late had in average better marks than their peers. As 
Arieli (2009: 116) later pointed out, these results are interesting in that 
they suggest that “although almost everyone has problems of procras-
tination, those who recognize and admit their weakness are in a better 
position to utilize available tools for precommitment and by doing so, 
help themselves overcome it”.
Moreover, the motivational model also predicts the efﬁ ciency of 
self-control strategies based on emotional regulation. Assuming that 
preference reversal is generally caused by a strong affect, managing 
emotions and moods appears to be one of the best methods to forestall 
impulsive behaviour. Although emotions, like beliefs, are in principle 
involuntary states, it seems possible to achieve this indirectly, either 
by focusing on the pertinent stimulus or by manipulating the external 
conditions (Mikolajczak et al. 2009: 168). The employee who doubts he 
will have enough courage to ask his boss for a raise may try to recall 
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vividly the injustices that he has suffered at work (Skinner 1953: 236). 
The mother who dreads the consequences of feeling overly angry at 
her child may attenuate that anger by focusing on the good moments 
they spent together (Mele 2001b: 106). And the person who is about to 
commit suicide may think of her beloved ones, or have the lucidity of 
thinking that it is probably a negative emotion that triggers an unre-
alistically pessimistic vision of the future. In each of these examples, 
the key aspect is that the agent’s strategy of self-control relies on the 
acknowledgement that her future judgment may be prone to motiva-
tional biases.
Finally, it is important to stress that these and other self-control 
strategies may also prove useful within the epistemic realm. It was 
suggested in the previous section that we are partly responsible for the 
irrationality of our beliefs, to the extent that we may exert a certain de-
gree of control over the process of belief formation. This claim has two 
signiﬁ cant implications. On the one hand, as we have seen, it becomes 
possible to develop what some authors call doxastic self-control (Audi 
2008, Mele 2001b) in an effort to counteract the effect of motivational 
biases. In this sense, as Mele (2001b: 98) observes, self-control strate-
gies may proﬁ tably be adopted to ensure the rationality of our beliefs, 
and not just of our actions: “Self-control, then, extends beyond action 
to belief”. But conversely, it becomes apparent that doxastic self-con-
trol is paramount, in turn, to ensure the rationality of our actions. The 
ability to prevent akratic behaviour, in particular, may presumably 
be constrained by our efforts to counteract motivational biases. This 
may be achieved through the adoption of reliable methods of inquiry, or 
through the development of a certain number of “intellectual virtues” 
(Zagzebski 1996, Montmarquet 2008). But precommitment strategies 
may also prove useful in the epistemic sphere. For example, a judge 
who recognizes that his racial prejudices are susceptible to inﬂ uence 
his judgment may scrupulously resort to the precommitment strategy 
of forcing herself to go through every piece of evidence once again be-
fore reaching a sentence. Likewise, the ﬁ nancial investor who is aware 
that optimism biases often lead people to overestimate the likelihood 
of positive events may self-impose a certain number of restrictions on 
all future investments (e.g., never invest more than what I can afford 
to lose, never put all my eggs in the same basket, always allocate my 
money equally to each of N funds). Whatever the strategy, the ﬁ rst step 
to ensure the rationality of our attitudes, whether on the practical or 
epistemic level, is the acknowledgment of the fallibility of human judg-
ment under the inﬂ uence of emotions.
6. Conclusion
This paper showed that an adequate understanding of self-deception 
holds the key to developing efﬁ cient strategies of self-control both in 
the practical and in the cognitive sphere. While intentionalists suggest 
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that self-deception is a paradoxical phenomenon, we have seen that the 
alleged paradoxes characterize the intentionalist model itself. In con-
trast, motivational models provide a non-paradoxical account of irra-
tionality without appealing to the postulate that the mind is divided6. 
This model proves consistent with the empirical studies carried out by 
social psychologists in the past decades, which converge in demonstrat-
ing that most people fall prey systematically to a variety of cognitive 
and motivational biases. Moreover, insofar as such biases also have 
an impact on practical judgments, and subsequently on our actions, it 
seems reasonable to speak of a uniﬁ ed account of irrationality, accord-
ing to which self-deception and akrasia are rooted in the phenomenon 
of motivated irrationality, that is, in the inﬂ uence that emotions and 
desires exert over people’s judgment. But the fact that motivational bi-
ases are both unconscious and involuntary does not seem to imply that 
people are merely the victims of their own illusions. We have the pos-
sibility, and perhaps the moral obligation, to adopt indirect strategies 
of doxastic self-control. If correctly implemented, these strategies have 
the ability to promote the rationality of our beliefs and our actions.
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